State of Utah v. Danilo Dela Cruz Pascual : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
State of Utah v. Danilo Dela Cruz Pascual : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff, J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; attorneys for appellee.
Scott L. Wiggins; Arnold & Wiggins; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Pascual, No. 20050261 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5679
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
v. 
DANILO DELA CRUZ PASCUAL, 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20050261-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Ruling on the Defendant's Motion for New Trial, 
which was signed by the district court on February 15, 2005, and 
entered that same day, in the Second District Court, Davis 
County, the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen, presiding. 
SCOTT L WIGGINS (5820) 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
105 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
FEB 2 3 2006 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
v. 
DANILO DELA CRUZ PASCUAL, 
Defendant / Appellant 
Case No. 20050261-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Ruling on the Defendant's Motion for New Trial, 
which was signed by the district court on February 15, 2005, and 
entered that same day, in the Second District Court, Davis 
County, the Honorable Darwin C. Hansen, presiding. 
SCOTT L WIGGINS (5820) 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
105 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
ARGUMENTS 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. PASCUAL OF HIS SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF OTHER 
CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS AND BY STIPULATING THAT MR. 
PASCUAL, AS A DRUG ABUSER, HAD WRONGFULLY 
REQUESTED A U.A. FROM ANOTHER PERSON 8 
A. Legal Principles Governing the Admissibility 
of Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts . .10 
B. Rule 404(b) Analysis of Admissibility 11 
CONCLUSION 17 
ADDENDA 19 
Addendum A: Amended Information 
Addendum B: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
Addendum C: Transcript of testimony of Officer Malan 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page(s) 
Federal Cases 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970) 10 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, (1993) 9 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 
(1984) 8,9,10 
State Cases 
Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P. 2d 803 (Utah 1988) 1,9 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516 (Utah 1994) 10 
State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, 108 P.3d 730 12 
State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 52 P.3d 1210 12,15 
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990) 9 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837 11,12 
State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) 11 
State v. Frame, 723 P. 2d 401 (Utah 1986) 10 
State v. ATaestas, 1999 UT 32, 984 P. 2d 376 1 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, 6 P.3d 1120 12 
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 9 
State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951 10 
State v. Shelton, 71 Wash.2d 838, 431 P.2d 201 (1967) 17 
State v. Shickles, 160 P.2d 291 (Utah 1995) 15 
iii 
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) 9,10 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 
988, 103 S.Ct. 341 (1982) 17 
State v. Wright, 893 P. 2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 9 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1 .2,4 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) 1 
COURT RULES CITED 
Utah R. Evid. 401 15 
Utah R. Evid. 402 11,15 
Utah R. Evid. 403 12,15,16 
Utah R. Evid. 404 11,12 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
OTHER AUTHORITY 
E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 565 (3d ed. 
1984) 16 
iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over 
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) 
(2002) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Pascual of 
the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel 
by failing to object to evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
and by stipulating that Mr. Pascual, as a drug abuser, had 
wrongfully requested a U.A. from S.M.'s father. To make such a 
showing, a defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a 
deficient performance, falling below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's 
performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P. 2d 803 (Utah 
1988). The appellate court reviews such a claim as a matter of 
law. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ^20, 984 P.2d 376. 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may 
be raised for the first time on appeal. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the failure of trial counsel to object to 
the State's presentation of evidence of Defendant's other crimes, 
wrongs or acts and trial counsel's deficient performance of 
stipulating that Defendant, as a drug abuser, had wrongfully 
requested a U.A. from another person. These failures precluded 
Defendant of a fair trial. 
Defendant was charged with Attempted Sodomy Upon a Child, a 
first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1. 
Thereafter, Defendant appeared before the district court and 
pleaded not guilty. 
Defendant appeared for a jury trial on February 23-24, 2004. 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Defendant as 
charged. 
Defendant filed a pro se Motion, requesting that the trial 
court set aside his verdict due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, Defendant's trial 
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counsel informed the trial court of Defendant's displeasure with 
his performance as trial counsel. The trial court allowed trial 
counsel to withdraw and then appointed new legal counsel to 
represent Defendant. 
On May 27, 2004, the trial court sentenced Defendant "to an 
indeterminate term of not less than three years and which may be 
for life in the Utah State Prison." Defendant, through appointed 
trial counsel, filed a timely Motion for a New Trial. 
At a hearing on November 12, 2 004, the parties, by way of 
proffer of evidence, argued the Motion for New Trial. The trial 
court requested additional legal memoranda and argument by legal 
counsel. 
Appointed trial counsel filed a memorandum in support of the 
Motion for a New Trial, and the State filed a response in 
opposition. On February 15, 2005, the trial court denied 
Defendant's Motion for a New Trial by way of written ruling. 
On March 15, 2005, Defendant, through appointed appellate 
counsel, filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Pascual was charged with Attempted Sodomy Upon a 
Child, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3 
5-403.1 (R. 52). See Amended Information, R. 52, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
2. On September 4, 2 0 03, Mr. Pascual appeared before the 
district court and pleaded not guilty (R. 20 and 34). 
3. Mr. Pascual appeared for a jury trial on February 23-24, 
2004 (R. 43-44 and 81-82) . 
4. At trial, the State called Officer Adam Malan, the 
investigating officer, as a witness (R. 245:70). 
^. During the course of the direct examination of Officer 
Malan, the State elicited the following testimony: 
Prosecutor: Did you ask [Defendant] point 
obviously, you did. What was 
[Defendant's] response during this 
interview when you asked him about his 
version of what happened between he and 
S.M. 
Officer Malan: His version of it was that he -- he made 
a very weak denial of it. He mentioned 
that back in the year 2 000 that he was a 
chronic drug user of methamphetamines, 
and there was times that he would do 
drugs all day and all night and then 
stay up, you know, two to three days in 
a row doing those drugs, and that he 
could not remember anything like that. 
And he indicated that if people are 
saying this is what he did, that he must 
have done it. 
* * * * 
Prosecutor: Did he ever -- Did he give you any 
examples or statements as to why he 
couldn't remember? 
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Officer Malan: As far as drug use, he indicated that he 
could not remember because he may have 
been on drugs at the time, and wishes he 
could remember. 
Prosecutor: Did he ever give you any specifics about 
this happening to him on other occasions 
about not being able to remember what he 
had done? 
Officer Malan: Yes. He mentioned there was one other 
time in his past that he was at a party 
or partying, and he woke up and there 
was a fat girl lying next to him and he 
couldn't remember the events of that 
night. He indicated that he was doing 
drugs on that night too. 
(R. 245:82-84). 
6. Defense counsel did not object. 
7. At the conclusion of the evidence, both the State and 
Defense counsel stipulated to the following: 
. . . rather than recalling the victim to testify, that 
she would --a question that she was asked about why --
what her testimony would be about why the Defendant had 
asked her to go wake up her father on the morning that 
this allegedly happened. And were she to come back on 
the stand to testify to you and explain that to you 
about what she knew and the circumstances of what 
transpired that morning, the answer would be because the 
Defendant needed or wanted her father to give him an 
U.A. sample because he was undergoing urinalysis testing 
at that time and one was required that morning. 
(R. 245:151-52). 
8. During closing argument, Mr. Pascual's trial counsel 
argued the following: 
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Not once can she describe what he was wearing. But his 
first words were, Hey, go get your dad up, will you. 
We've stipulated the reason he went to get his [sic] dad 
up 'cause he had a urinalysis that he had to do and he 
wasn't clean. He needed a clean U.A. sample. That may 
seem kind of gross to you, but it's unfortunately fairly 
common occurrence in this day and age. He admitted in 
his statement he had been taking methamphetamine. I 
don't know what you know about methamphetamine, but it's 
a pretty nasty drug. He wasn't clean. 
(R. 246:28:4-13) . 
9. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Mr. 
Pascual as charged (R. 81; R. 246:36:1-3). 
10. On March 25, 2004, Mr. Pascual filed a pro se Motion, 
requesting that the trial court set aside his verdict due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 92-94). 
11. At the subsequent sentencing hearing, on April 15, 2004, 
Mr. Pascual's trial counsel, Mr. Roy D. Cole, informed the trial 
court of Mr. Pascual's displeasure with his performance as trial 
counsel (R. 243:2-4). The trial court allowed Mr. Cole to 
withdraw as counsel and then appointed Mr. Todd Utzinger to 
represent Mr. Pascual (R. 243:4-5). 
12. On May 27, 2004, the trial court sentenced Mr. Pascual 
uto an indeterminate term of not less than three years and which 
may be for life in the Utah State Prison." (R. 138-39). See 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, R. 13 8-39, a true and correct copy 
of which is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
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13. Mr. Pascual, through appointed trial counsel, filed a 
timely Motion for a New Trial (R. 142-48). 
14. At a hearing on November 12, 2 004, the parties, by way 
of proffer of evidence, argued the Motion for New Trial (R. 156). 
The trial court requested additional legal memoranda and argument 
by legal counsel (R. 156). 
15. Appointed trial counsel filed a memorandum in support of 
the Motion for a New Trial (R. 157-64) , and the State filed a 
response in opposition (R. 168-200) . 
16. On February 15, 2005, the trial court denied Mr. 
Pascual's Motion for a New Trial by way of written ruling (R. 201-
13) . 
17. On March 15, 2005, Mr. Pascual, through appointed 
appellate counsel, filed a timely Notice of Appeal (R. 214-17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Trial counsel denied Mr. Pascual of his Sixth Amendment 
right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to object 
to evidence of Mr. Pascual's other crimes, wrongs or acts and by 
stipulating that Mr. Pascual, as a drug abuser, had wrongfully 
requested a U.A. from another person. Trial counsel's failure to 
object to the State's presentation of evidence of Mr. Pascual's 
abuse of methamphetamines and the stipulation by trial counsel 
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that Mr. Pascual, as a drug abuser, had requested that S.M.'s 
father wrongfully provide a U.A. for his urinalysis test fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. 
This is demonstrated by existing Utah case law and the underlying 
factual circumstances of this case. But for counsel's 
unprofessional errors of failing to object to the evidence of Mr. 
Pascual's other crimes or wrong acts and by stipulating that Mr. 
Pascual had wrongfully requested another to provide a U.A. for 
him, the result at trial would have been different. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. PASCUAL OF HIS SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF OTHER 
CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS AND BY STIPULATING THAT MR. 
PASCUAL, AS A DRUG ABUSER, HAD WRONGFULLY 
REQUESTED A U.A. FROM ANOTHER PERSON. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test 
for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment1 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 2064. This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a 
defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
1The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
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performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright, 893 
P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). " [T] he right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair 
sentencing. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 
838, 842, (1993). 
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
"'identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
xshow that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). A defendant must "overcome 
the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment." State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 
U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 
1994); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
A. Legal Principles Governing the Admissibility 
of Evidence of Other Crimes# Wrongs or Acts 
As a fundamental principle of law, a person may be convicted 
criminally only for his or her acts and not for his or her general 
character. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ifl5, 992 P.2d 951. 
This fundamental principle is violated "if a conviction is based 
on an inference that conviction is justified because of the 
defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts." 
Id. "The admission of evidence of prior crimes may have such a 
powerful tendency to mislead the finder of fact as to subvert the 
constitutional principle that a defendant may be convicted only if 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific crime charged." 
Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068 
(1970) ) . Hence, the law has long prohibited the admission of 
prior crime evidence unless the proffered evidence is probative of 
an issue other than criminal propensity or character and is not 
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unduly prejudicial. Id. "The rule limiting the admissibility of 
evidence of prior crimes, as presently stated in rule 404(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, has existed for almost a century in 
this state." Id. (string citation omitted). Although the Utah 
Supreme Court, in State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, H1fl2-35, 993 P. 2d 
83 7, addressed and limited prior statements of the rule 
articulated in State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), "the 
basic concepts embodied in the rule limiting the use of prior 
crime evidence remain intact." Id. 
B. Rule 404(b) Analysis of Admissibility 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) governs the admission of 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs or bad acts. Rule 404(b) 
provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident . . . . 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b) . Prior to deciding whether evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or bad acts is admissible under Rule 404(b), "the 
trial court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being 
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) 
whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) 
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whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State 
v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, 1[l6, 6 P. 3d 1120 (citing State v. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 1f2l-22, 29, 993 P.2d 837). 
"A trial court's admission of evidence under rule 404(b) is 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard." State v. Allen, 
2005 UT 11, f 15, 108 P.3d 730; State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f56, 52 
P. 3d 1210 (citing Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at fl8) . However, 
"admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously 
examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of that 
discretion." Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at 1fl8 (citation omitted). 
In the instant case, the State, during the direct examination 
of Officer Adam Malan, wrongfully and needlessly elicited evidence 
of Mr. Pascual's prior drug abuse of methamphetamines. On the 
direct examination of Officer Malan, the State elicited the 
following testimonial evidence: 
Prosecutor: Did you ask [Defendant] point 
obviously, you did. What was 
[Defendant's] response during this 
interview when you asked him about his 
version of what happened between he and 
S.M. 
Officer Malan: His version of it was that he -- he made 
a very weak denial of it. He mentioned 
that back in the year 2 000 that he was a 
chronic drug user of methamphetamines, 
and there was times that he would do 
drugs all day and all night and then 
stay up, you know, two to three days in 
a row doing those drugs, and that he 
could not remember anything like that. 
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And he indicated that if people are 
saying this is what he did, that he must 
have done it. 
Prosecutor: 
Officer Malan: 
Prosecutor: 
Did he ever -- Did he give you any 
examples or statements as to why he 
couldn't remember? 
As far as drug use, he indicated that he 
could not remember because he may have 
been on drugs at the time, and wishes he 
could remember. 
Did he ever give you any specifics about 
this happening to him on other occasions 
about not being able to remember what he 
had done? 
Officer Malan: Yes. He mentioned there was one other 
time in his past that he was at a party 
or partying, and he woke up and there 
was a fat girl lying next to him and he 
couldn't remember the events of that 
night. He indicated that he was doing 
drugs on that night too.2 
(R. 245:82-84). Defendant's trial counsel did not object. 
Moreover, at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, both 
the State and Defendant's trial counsel stipulated to the 
following: 
. . . rather than recalling the victim to testify, that 
she would --a question that she was asked about why --
what her testimony would be about why the Defendant had 
asked her to go wake up her father on the morning that 
this allegedly happened. And were she to come back on 
the stand to testify to you and explain that to you 
2A true and correct copy of the transcript containing 
testimony of Officer Malan is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
the 
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about what she knew and the circumstances of what 
transpired that morning, the answer would be because the 
Defendant needed or wanted her father to give him an 
U.A. sample because he was undergoing urinalysis testing 
at that time and one was required that morning. 
(R. 245:151-52). 
Trial counsel's failure to object to the State's presentation 
of evidence of Mr. Pascual's abuse of methamphetamines and the 
stipulation by trial counsel that Mr. Pascual, as a drug abuser, 
had requested that S.M.'s father wrongfully provide a U.A. for his 
urinalysis test fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment. This is demonstrated by existing Utah case 
law and the underlying factual circumstances of this case. 
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to object 
to the evidence of Mr. Pascual's other crimes or wrong acts, the 
result at trial would have been different. Had trial counsel 
objected, the trial court, under the first part of the 
aforementioned test of admissibility, would have abused its 
discretion had it admitted the evidence of Mr. Pascual's drug 
abuse. The same analysis applies to Mr. Pascual's request to 
obtain a wrongful U.A. in contravention of his requisite 
urinalysis test, to which trial counsel readily stipulated at 
trial. 
The record demonstrates that evidence of Mr. Pascual's prior 
drug abuse or the wrongfully requested U.A. was not offered for a 
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non-character purpose. Moreover, evidence of the prior drug abuse 
or wrongfully requested U.A. does not satisfy the requirements of 
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 02.3 
The record demonstrates that the evidence of Mr. Pascual's 
prior drug abuse and the wrongfully requested U.A. was less than 
probative of any material fact to the crimes charged. Other than 
propensity to commit the crime, evidence of Mr. Pascual's prior 
drug abuse or the wrongfully requested U.A. did not tend to prove 
a material fact of the crimes charged. 
Finally, had trial counsel objected, the trial court would 
have erred if it had concluded that the evidence of Mr. Pascual's 
prior drug abuse or the wrongfully requested U.A. met the 
requirements of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. In State 
v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice and the like substantially 
outweighs the incremental probative value, a 
variety of matters must be considered, 
including the strength of the evidence as to 
3According to Rule 402, u[e]vidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. uvRelevant evidence' means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. 
"Other crime evidence is admissible if it 'tends to prove some fact 
that is material to the crime charged--other than the defendant's 
propensity to commit crime.'" State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at 1(56, 52 
P.3d 1210. 
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the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval 
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which 
the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
Id. at 2 95-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 
565 (3d ed. 1984)); see also Utah R. Evid. 403.4 The manner in 
which the evidence of Mr. Pascual's drug abuse and the wrongfully 
requested U.A. were presented at trial increased the likelihood 
that the jury would and did convict Mr. Pascual based on his 
criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts. 
The need for the evidence was extremely low, if not 
nonexistent, in the instant case. In short, the evidence of Mr. 
Pascual's prior drug abuse and the wrongfully requested U.A. was 
unnecessary to the State's case, especially when considered in 
light of the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury based solely on Mr. Pascual's criminal 
character or propensity to commit bad acts. Moreover, in light of 
the factual circumstances of the case and the evidence presented 
at trial, the evidence of Mr. Pascual's prior drug abuse or the 
wrongfully requested U.A. was unnecessary to the defense utilized 
4Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
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at trial. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89-90 (Utah), cert, 
denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 341 (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
306.5 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Pascual respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse his conviction and remand the case to the 
district court for a new trial and for any further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's instructions as set forth in its 
opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of February, 2006. 
5Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 states that "[v]oluntary intoxication 
shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication 
negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of the 
offense. . . . " Moreover, it would not be a defense to a crime that 
a defendant is a drug addict. Cf. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89 
(Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 341 (1982) (citing 
State v. Shelton, 71 Wash.2d 838, 431 P.2d 201 (1967)). 
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IN i i IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DANILO DELA CRUZ PASCUAL 
DOB: 01/10/1956, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 031700662 
The undersigned prosecutor states on informatioji .iinl belief that the defendant, 
during the year 2000 at County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the crime of: 
ATTFMPTPI) : {<)!')< )MY I IPO? I A ( i l l ! I), ((}}2\ 7<>-5-4U't I IK YV, I'M si ue-ie,-
felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant did attempt to engage m a 
sexual ac t upon c i v:v Itl 1 a child i n ider the age of 1 4„ involving the genitals or anus of the actor or 
the child and the mouth or anus of either person, regardless of the sex of either participant. 
I iris information is based on evidence obtained from witness Adam Malan. 
oil* 
Authorized this J J day of I Vf 
for presentment and filing: 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County 
U) MP. y)*u 
DeputyfDavrs CoiMy Attorney 
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DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P] ail iti f f 
vs. 
DANILO DELA CRUZ PASCUAL, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
HEARING ON MOTION 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: (VU7G0662 FS 
Judge: DARWIN C. HANSEN 
Date: May 27, 2004 
PRESENT 
Clerk: glendap 
Reporter: PRATT, JOANNE 
Prosecutor: RAWLINGS, TROY 
Defendant 
Defendant' s Attorney (; 3) 1 UTZINGER, TODD 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January ] 0, J! 956 
CAT/CIC 
Tape Number: 5/2//04 Tape Count: 11 .04 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED SODOMY M A CHILD - 1ST.. Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilt Disposition: 02/24/2004 Guilty 
HEARING 
The defendant has filed an appeal, but the defendant needs to be 
sentenced before he can appeal. The defendant will be sentenced 
today. 
The defendant wants to file a motion for a new trial. The 
defendant states he has understood everything today and voluntarily 
waives an interpreter today, 
The defendant to pay restitution of $141.88. A J 1 ldgmei it and 
Commitment to the Utah State Prison is signed. 
An interpreter will be needed if the defendant has a new trial. 
Page 1 
Case No: 031700662 
Date: May 27, 2004 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED SODOMY ON A CHILD 
a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not less than three years and which may be life in the Utah 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the DAVIS County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Dated this day of 
strict Court Judge 
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1 A. YES. 
2 Q. ANY SIONHTCAUT VARIATION'-", «| \<.\ ' lANCh:., '•'!' M,l, 
3 A. THERE WAS JUST SOME OTHER ADDED DETAILS AS FAR AS LIKE 
4 WHAT SHE WAS WKARTNG AND WHAT THE DEFKHDANT WAS WEARING. 
5 Q. ALL RIGHT. DETECTIVE, BASED UPON THIS INFORMATION THEN, 
• '• --OM GOT THE TWO STATEMENTS FROM THE VICTIM. DID YOU 
..ERMINE THAT IT JUSTIFIED OR WARRANTED TRYING TO INTERVIEW 
'HE DEFENDANT? 
YES. 
10 AND WERE YOU ABLE TO DO THAT? DID YOU HAVE A 
11 CONVERSATION WITH ML' I'ASCUAI, • 
12 YE::-;, I DID. 
131 AND WHAT WAS THE DATE OF THAT CONVERSATION AND THE 
14I LOCATION? 
15 A. THAT WAS APRIL 4TH, 2003, AT THE CLEARFIELD POLICE 
16 DEPARTMENT. 
17 Q. AND HE CAME INTO THE CLEARFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT? 
18 A. Y . 
19 y. AND YOU TALKED WITH HIM THERE. 
20 J .. YES, x bxu. 
211 '. AND vrur -- DID YOU AUDIO OR VIDEO RECORD THAT INTERVIEW? 
22 A. :-,S, BUT... 
23 0. DO YOU HAVE A COPY OF THE RECORDING THAT WAS MADE 
24 OF THAT INTERVIEW HERE TODAY? 
25 A. • I HAVE IT RIGHT HERE. 
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Q. AND YOU'RE GONNA TESTIFY HERE UNDER OATH ABOUT THE 
CONTENTS OF THAT INTERVIEW AND WHAT HAPPENED? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOUR TESTIMONY COULD BE CROSS-CHECKED OR VERIFIED 
WITH THE RECORDED INTERVIEW THAT YOU HAVE THERE. 
A. YES, THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. WHEN YOU INTERVIEWED DANIEL — DANILO PASCUAL ON APRIL 
4TH AT CLEARFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT, DID YOU CONFRONT HIM 
WITH THE ALLEGATIONS THAT SONJA WAS MAKING ABOUT HIM? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHAT IF ANYTHING AT ALL DID HE INDICATE TO YOU ABOUT — 
ABOUT WHERE SONJA WOULD SLEEP IN THE HOUSE DURING THE — 
DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME OF 2000? 
A. HE MENTIONED TO ME THAT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SONJA 
ALWAYS SLEPT ON THE COUCH, AND THAT HE WOULD ALSO SEE HER 
WHEN HE WOULD WALK IN FROM EITHER GOING OR — TO WORK OR 
COMING FROM WORK. 
Q. SO HE DID — HE WAS ABLE TO CORROBORATE THAT DETAIL OF 
HER ACCOUNT THAT SHE SLEPT ON THE COUCH? 
A. YES. 
Q. DID YOU ASK HIM POINT — OBVIOUSLY, YOU DID. WHAT WAS 
HIS RESPONSE DURING THIS INTERVIEW WHEN YOU ASKED HIM ABOUT 
HIS VERSION OF WHAT HAPPENED BETWEEN HE AND SONJA? 
A. HIS VERSION OF IT WAS THAT HE — HE MADE A VERY WEAK 
DENIAL OF IT. HE MENTIONED THAT BACK IN THE YEAR 2000 THAT 
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HE WAS A CHRONIC DRUG USER OF METHAMPHETAMINES, AND THERE WAS 
TIMES THAT HE WOULD DO DRUGS ALL DAY AND ALL NIGHT AND THEN 
STAY UP, YOU KNOW, TWO TO THREE DAYS IN A ROW DOING THOSE 
DRUGS, AND THAT HE COULD NOT REMEMBER ANYTHING LIKE THAT. 
AND HE INDICATED THAT IF PEOPLE ARE SAYING THIS IS WHAT HE 
DID, THAT HE MUST HAVE DONE IT. 
Q. SO DIDN'T — DIDN'T COME OUT AND ADAMANTLY DENY IT AND 
SAY, NO WAY, I — I REMEMBER, IT DIDN'T HAPPEN, NOTHING LIKE 
THAT? 
A. NO. 
Q. HE HAD INDICATED THEN TO YOU THAT — AT SOME POINT IN 
TIME DID HE EVER INDICATE TO YOU WHAT HE THOUGHT IN HIS OWN 
MIND AS TO WHETHER HE HAD DONE IT OR NOT? 
A. YES. HE — HE SAID IN THE BACK OF HIS MIND, HE 
QUESTIONS WHETHER HE DID IT OR NOT. 
Q. BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW FOR SURE BECAUSE HE COULDN'T 
REMEMBER. 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. DID HE EVER — DID HE GIVE YOU ANY EXAMPLES OR 
STATEMENTS AS TO WHY HE COULDN'T REMEMBER? 
A. AS FAR AS THE DRUG USE, HE INDICATED THAT HE COULD NOT 
REMEMBER BECAUSE HE MAY HAVE BEEN ON DRUGS AT THE TIME, AND 
WISHES HE COULD REMEMBER. 
Q. DID HE EVER GIVE YOU ANY SPECIFICS ABOUT THIS HAPPENING 
TO HIM ON OTHER OCCASIONS ABOUT NOT BEING ABLE TO REMEMBER 
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WHAT HE HAD DONE? 
A. YES. HE MENTIONED THERE WAS ONE OTHER TIME IN HIS PAST 
THAT HE WAS AT A PARTY OR PARTYING, AND HE WOKE UP AND THERE 
WAS A FAT GIRL LYING NEXT TO HIM AND HE COULDN'T REMEMBER THE 
EVENTS OF THAT NIGHT. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS DOING DRUGS 
ON THAT NIGHT, TOO. 
Q. AND HE ALSO TOLD YOU HE COULDN'T REMEMBER IF ANYTHING 
HAPPENED WITH HE AND SONJA OR NOT. 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. RAWLINGS: I DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR 
HONOR. 
THE COURT: YOU MAY CROSS-EXAMINE. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. COLE: 
Q. SERGEANT MALAN, I GOTTA THANK YOU FOR BEING HERE. 
A. WELCOME. 
Q. I KNOW THIS TAKES TIME AWAY FROM OTHER WORK YOU'VE GOT 
TO DO. LET'S REVIEW HERE FOR JUST ONE SECOND THE SITUATION. 
DO YOU KNOW, HAVE THE POLICE EVER BEEN CALLED TO THE HOME OF 
MR. MATTHEWS AND HIS GIRLFRIEND? 
A. DURING WHAT TIME? 
Q. WELL, AT ANY TIME FOR ANY KIND OF DOMESTIC THINGS OR 
ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE? 
A. I DON'T. 
Q. DID YOU IN YOUR INVESTIGATION FIND THAT THIS WAS A HAPPY 
